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Like most small and open economies, Costa Rica has 
always been vulnerable to the influence of external forces. 
After 1973, however, the country experienced several exter-
nal shocks that caused much greater disturbance than any 
suffered during the previous two decades. Since this 
sequence of sizable shocks took place in a relatively short 
period of time, it substantially increased the instability 
of the economy and magnified its adjustment problems. 
Although the various disturbances differed among themselves 
in nature, their effects reinforced each other, while rigi-
dities in the economic and political system made adjustment 
difficult. This chapter examines the nature of these 
shocks, the problems that they posed, and the ways in which 
the country dealt with them. 
In 1982 Costa Rica found itself in the midst of an 
acute crisis, characterized by a stagnant economy, growing 
unemployment, rampant inflation, and a rapid devaluation of 
its currency. In addition, the country had accumulated a 
huge foreign debt that it found very difficult to service. 
Paradoxically, Costa Rica had shown remarkable progress 
during the previous three decades, in terms of both economic 
growth and social welfare improvements. Given the country's 
resource base, particularly its homogeneous and well-
educated population, as well as its political stability, a 
2 
longstanding democratic tradition, a large middle class, and 
a less uneven distribution of income than most other Latin 
American countries, many find it difficult to understand the 
speed with which the economic situation deteriorated and the 
extent of the damage to the country's economic and political 
structures. As a recent report claimed, "no one would have 
predicted the present outcome even as recently as five years 
ago, when the country was enjoying an extraordinary coffee 
bonanza. "1 Although the seeds of the crisis had been sown a 
long time before, one cannot help but be impressed by the 
degree of change the country has experienced and the speed 
with which this change has occurred. 
This chapter provides a systematic description of the 
difficult problems of adjustment faced by a small open eco-
nomy. Although political influences on the evolution of 
events have been taken into account, no attempt has been 
made to explain them. The analysis herein suffers from all 
the biases implicit in an economic approach; moreover, it 
does not strive for the formal elegance of economic models. 
The chain of events that took place could have been easily 
predicted from the perspective of economic theory, but the 
fact that the Costa Rican political system did not react 
with the speed, energy, and innovation required to avoid a 
major crisl.s suggests that democratic countries may face 
serious political constraints in adjusting to sharp external 
shocks. Moreover, I argue that serious mistakes of economic 
3 
policy management resulted from political attempts to avoid 
or postpone an appropriate adjustment, and that these errors 
further complicated the problem and significantly increased 
the social costs of adjusting. Short-term political gains 
were thus obtained at a very high price. In turn, the eco-
nomic crisis that resulted could eventually undermine the 
country's political system. 
THE NATURE OF THE SHOCKS 
Economic crisis in Costa Rica has been the consequence 
of a combination of long-term structural trends, whose unfa-
vorable effects accumulated slowly but steadily, and of par-
ticularly unfortunate short-term circumstances, both at home 
and abroad. These short-term circumstances included drama-
tic external shocks, followed by slow and faulty policy 
decisions in response to these shocks. 
The major external shocks were (1) the two inter-
national oil crises, in 1973-74 and 1978-80: (2} sharp 
increases and subsequent declines in the international 
prices of several agricultural commodities, associated with 
the coffee boom of 1976-77; and (3) changes in the country's 
access to international capital markets. Easy access to 
borrowing abroad was made possible in the mid-1970s by the 
international recycling of oil profits and the country's 
creditworthiness during the coffee boom. However, high 
interest rates that eventually resulted from world inflation 
greatly increased the burden of servicing this debt, at a 
time when the large capital inflows of the earlier years 
were abruptly interrupted because of the crisis. 
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War, insurrection, and political instability in Central 
America reinforced the unfavorable structural trends impli-
cit in the protectionist strategy of import substitution (as 
subsequently discussed) and added further sources of exter-
nal disturbance. Political events in Central America, 
however, have not been the major cause of the economic 
crisis in Costa Rica. This crisis would have occurred even 
in the absence of turmoil in the rest of the isthmus. 
Although this turmoil has not yet reached Costa Rica, the 
deterioration of the Central American political situation 
and the uncertainty about the economic and social policies 
of regimes in the area have reduced the viability of the 
Central American Common Market and its attractiveness for 
Costa Rican exporters. Morover, by reducing confidence and 
accentuating pessimistic expectations, political develop-
ments have contributed to the contraction of domestic 
investment and to substantial capital outflows. Events in 
Central America, therefore, have accentuated the crisis and 
have added further constraints to the adjustment. 
STRUCTURAL BACKGROUND 
The nature, extent, and duration of the crisis are in 
part explaLned by the structural features of the Costa Rican 
economy. These elements reflect contradictions between some 
of the country's most basic characteristics and some of the 
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features of the protectionist strategy of import substitu-
tion adopted Ln the late 1950s. Since this strategy has 
been pursued for almost three decades, its consequences have 
been incorporated into the country's productive structure. 
The contradictions reflect a neglect of crucial economic 
variables, like market size and factor endowments. 
Two main characteristics of the Costa Rican economy 
have been its small size, with the limitations imposed by a 
poor domestic market, and its high degree of openness to 
foreign trade, a consequence of small size. With a popula-
tion of 2.3 million inhabitants and a gross domestic product 
(GDP) of about 100 billion colones in 1982, Costa Rica is a 
very small economy. 2 Given a specialized resource base and 
a small domestic market, traditionally the country has 
understood that foreign trade must serve as the economy's 
engine of growth. Thus, much of the impulse for growth 
during this century has been provided by the export of agri-
cultural commodities. Exports of coffee, bananas, sugar, 
and beef have raised the levels of domestic output and 
income, increased the country's import capacity, and yielded 
many of the dynamic benefits of specialization. 
Costa Rica is one of the most open economies in the 
world. Duriny the past three decades, exports have 
represented between one-fifth and two-fifths of the GDP 
and this proportion has increased over time. 3 Imports have 
represented between one-quarter and one-half of the GDP, 
with a similar increasing trend. About two-thirds of the 
country's agricultural output has been exported, whereas 
agricultural exports have earned about two-thirds of its 
foreign exchange. Trade has also played an important role 
in the development of the manufacturing sector. When Costa 
Rica joined the Central American Common Market in 1963, 
exports of manufactured goods represented only 4 percent of 
total exports, but this grew to 29 percent by 1979. About 
four-fifths of these exports, however, have gone to markets 
in Central America protected by the regional integration 
effort, rather than into competitive world markets. 
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With its participation in the Central American Common 
Market, Costa Rica consolidated its choice of a protec-
tionist strategy of industrialization via import substitu-
tion. This decision modified the nature of the economy's 
external dependence. At the regional level the strategy 
involved free trade among the Common Market partners and the 
establishment of a common, highly protective, external 
tariff barrier for imports from all other countries. Costa 
Rica chose to increase the degree of openness with respect 
to Central America, while at the same time reducing openness 
with respect to the rest of the world. 
Industrialization via import substitution was adopted 
in order to reduce dependence on international markets and 
to avoid the fluctuations and uncertainties associated with 
a concentration on exports of primary products. It was 
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believed that the regional market offered a greater growth 
potential and was safer and more predictable than the inter-
national market. Recent political events in the isthmus 
show that this regional market is no longer secure. 
Furthermore, it has never been a large market. Market size 
is crucial for successful industrialization, because it 
determines the scope for the exploitation of economies of 
scale and the extent of competition, as well as the degree 
of viable specialization. Market size also influences the 
extent to which inward-oriented industrial development may 
proceed without incurring excessive costs. Unfortunately, 
regional integration in Central America led to the 
establishment of many high cost industries and to limited 
competitiveness in international markets. 
GRADUAL STAGNATION 
The Costa Rican economy grew at a very satisfactory 
pace during the past two decades. Between 1960 and 1980, 
the GOP, measured in 1966 prices, grew at an average rate of 
5.8 percent per annum. However, although the average annual 
rate of GDP growth was 7.0 percent for 1965-70 and 6.0 per-
cent for 1970-75, it was only 5.2 percent for 1975-80. This 
long-run decline in growth rates has been accentuated by the 
recent crisis. From a historical high of 8.9 percent per 
annum in 1977, a consequence of the coffee boom, this rate 
of growth rapidly dropped and finally became negative in 
1981 and 1982 (-2.3 and -9.1 percent, respectively). 
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The decline in growth rates has been shared by all 
major sectors. The average annual rate of GDP growth in the 
agricultural sector, measured in 1966 prices, dropped from 
8.1 percent for 1965-70 and 3.4 percent for 1970-75 to only 
1.8 percent for 1975-80, despite the coffee boom. This 
deceleration reflected, in part, the penalization of 
agriculture and exports that resulted from the import-
substitution strategy of industrialization. The industrial 
sector has also stagnated. The average annual rate of GDP 
growth in manufacturing, measured in 1966 prices, dropped 
from 9.3 percent for 1965-70 and 8.9 percent for 1970-75 to 
6.0 percent for 1975-80. Recently, this rate of growth 
steadily declined from 12.7 percent in 1977 to a negative 
-0.5 percent in 1981 and -14.9 in 1982. 
The relatively high rates of growth in the manufac-
turing sector during the 1960s and early 1970s resulted from 
the dramatic increase in Central American trade after the 
formation of the customs union in 1963. During this first 
stage of import substitution, domestic production rose more 
rapidly than domestic consumption, as it not only provided 
for increases in consumption but also replaced previous 
imports, which had represented the main source of supply of 
manufactures. Eventually, this "easy" stage of import 
sUbstitution was exhausted and the growth rate of manufac-
turing output declined to the level of the growth rate of 
domestic consumption, which in turn continued to be deter-
mined mostly by the country's exports to international 
markets. Indeed, an external shock, the coffee boom, 
explained why this long-term trend toward stagnation was 
temporarily stopped in the mid-1970s. Otherwise, the 
strategy's negative impact on growth would have become evi-
dent earlier. 
PRO'rECTIONISM AND RIGIDITY 
The setting up of manufacturing industries to serve a 
small regional market was based on high protection. 
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Although very high levels of effective protection were 
adopted for most consumer goods, low and even negative rates 
of effective protection were granted for the production of 
raw materials, intermediate inputs, and capital goods. 4 
Moreover, the effective rates of protection have been 
characterized by a great dispersion. Almost half have 
fallen below 50 percent, whereas for about one-fifth of the 
items these rates have been above 200 percent. Although the 
average legal rate of effective protection has been about 
164 percent, it has been about 231 percent for traditional 
consumer goods and only 77 percent for intermediate goods 
and 62 percent for metal-mechanic industries. Moreover, 
protection was accentuated by favorable fiscal treatment, 
tax concessions, and other incentives for investment in the 
industrial sector, as well as by credit and foreign exchange 
policies that implicitly subsidized these activities. When 
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all the determinants of effective protection are taken into 
account, "Costa Rica has been the most highly protected 
country in the region."5 
One of the consequences of this structure of protection 
has been a very high import intensity in the manufacturing 
sector. It has been estimated that in order to produce $100 
worth of output, the manufacturing sector needs $80 of 
imported inputs. As a result, the Costa Rican economy has 
become increasingly dependent on imported raw materials, 
intermediate inputs, and capital goods, and this has led to 
increasing rigidity in the economy. That is, not only has 
the Costa Rican economy progressively lost its dynamism, but 
it has also become less capable of adjusting to the inevi-
table external shocks. One of the main reasons for this 
increased rigidity has been the high import intensity of its 
manufacturing sector. This has been reflected in the com-
position of imports, of which less than 20 percent represent 
consumer goods. The balance-of-payments adjustment required 
after an unfavorable external shock forces a reduction of 
imports, mostly of raw materials, intermediate inputs, and 
capital goods destined for industrial firms. ~djustment, 
therefore, implies a reduction of the level of activity, 
investment, and growth in the manufacturing sector, and 
eventually unemployment. 
This scenario introduces an important dilemma for Costa 
Rican policymakers: Sharp balance-of-payments adjustments 
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have a negative impact on growth and employment, par-
ticularly in the manufacturing sector. This impact takes 
place at a time when export earnings, due to the external 
shock, are also contracting. On the other hand, lack of 
balance-of-payments adjustment, which would otherwise be 
attained through increased foreign borrowings and the intro-
duction of domestic controls, worsens the economy's long-
term problems and increases the social costs of the final 
adjustment. 
As the Costa Rican manufacturing sector is politically 
strong, delay of the adjustment has also been associated 
with attempts to divert the costs of adjusting to other sec-
tors through increased intervention in the economy. The 
government, in turn, has been willing to respond to these 
demands that the adjustment be postponed, because it has 
preferred to adopt a short-run perspective, particularly 
when elections are near. All of this has introduced greater 
rigidity in the choice of economic policies, has led to a 
postponement of the adjustment, and has greatly increased 
the social costs of the crisis. 
The nonuniform tariff structure associated with the 
protectionist strategy of industrialization has also 
reflected the permissive attitude associated with granting 
protection. Incentives have been provided to all politi-
cally strong investors, including multinational cor-
porations, and the magnitude of the assistance has mostly 
reflected the relative strength of the participants in the 
political arena. Much entrepreneurial time and effort has 
been spent in lobbying rather than in increasing produc-
tivity. As a consequence, specific activities have been 
promoted without concern for compdrative advantages within 
the manufacturing sector. 
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The distortions and inefficiencies brought about by 
this permissive attitude are apparent in the structure of 
production, impose high costs on domestic consumers and 
increase the rigidity of the economy. A clear example of 
inefficiency has been the protection of about a dozen car-
assembling plants, all atte1npting to supply the miniscule 
Costa Rican market and generating negative net domestic 
value added. Furthermore, neglect of efficiency and of co~ 
parative advantages has resulted in a limited capacity on 
the part of the manufacturing sector to compete outside the 
protected Central American Common Market. When the Common 
Market finally broke down, exports of manufactures could not 
be diverted to other markets, a factor that also contributed 
to the stagnation of the Costa Rican economy. 
FACTOR PRICES AND EMPLOYMENT 
Another key feature of Costa Rica is its relative abun-
dance of labor. The protectionist strategy distorted not 
only relative commodity prices, turning the domestic terms-
or-trade against agriculture: it also distorted relative 
factor prices, thereby underpricing capital and overpricing 
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labor in the modern sector of the economy. Minimum wages 
and substantial payroll taxes, used to finance several 
public sector programs, resulted in an effective cost of 
labor for employers considerably higher than the wages 
actually received by workers. Social security and other 
charges mandated by the government imposed a surcharge of at 
least 26 percent on all wages and salaries. Modern sector 
wages became higher than the social opportunity cost of 
labor for the economy as a whole. 
At the same time, several policies underpriced capital 
for the modern sector. These policies included the tax 
treatment of investments, which granted tax breaks on physi-
cal capital formation but not on human capital or tech-
nological development; the fixed, overvalued foreign 
exchange rate, which set the cost of imported capital below 
its social opportunity cost; tariff exemption for capital 
imports, which increased the rate of effective protection of 
capital-intensive activitie;: and the credit-rationing poli-
cies that resulted from und~r-equilibrium interest rates in 
formal financial markets, which have favored relatively 
capital-intensive activitie;. 
While trade policies have favored manufacturing, the 
most capital-intensive sectJr of the economy, factor-price 
policies have favored capit~l-intensive techniques in the 
rapidly growing modern sectJrs. The result has been limited 
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labor absorption by the private nodern sector, where produc-
tivity and wages have been higher than those in the tradi-
tional sectors. This has forced the public sector to become 
an active employer in order to avoid higher unemployment. 
The limited job-generating capacity of the manufacturing 
sector has been reflected in the fact that during the first 
decade after Costa Rica joined the Common Market, between 
the census years of 1963 and 1973, the relative contribution 
of manufacturing to the GOP increased from 14.3 to 19.7 per-
cent {for a gain of 5.4 points), whereas the proportion of 
the labor force employed in the manufacturing sector 
increased from 11.7 to 12.9 percent {for a gain of only 1.2 
points}. During the second half of the 1970s, the propor-
tion of the labor force employed in manufacturing increased 
to 16.3 percent (1979}, but declined during the crisis to 
15.4 percent {1982}. 
As a consequence, public sector employment increased 
more rapidly than private sector employment. Between 1950 
and 1980, while the latter grew at an average annual rate of 
2.7 percent, the former rose at an average annual rate of 
7.4 percent. Recently the difference has increased. 
Between 1973 and 1980 private sector employment grew, on the 
average, at an annual rate of 3.4 percent, while public sec-
tor employment increased more than twice as rapidly, at an 
average rate of 8.0 percent. This rapid growth of public 
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sector employment, both in the central government and auto-
nomous institutions, meant that the relative share of the 
public sector in total employment increased from 6.1 percent 
in 1950, to 15.3 percent in 1973, and to 19.7 percent in 
1980. In the second half of the l970s, about two out of 
every five new jobs in the economy were created by the 
public sector, such that today one out of every five workers 
is employed in this sector. 
This explosion of public sector employment has 
reflected an implicit policy to keep unemployment low, 
particularly of qualified and professional workers, in the 
presence of trade and factor-price policies that have 
reduced the incentives to hire workers in the private 
sector. On the other hand, the rapid expansion of public 
sector employment has caused a growing fiscal deficit, which 
is at the root of the more recent financial crisis. In 
turn, the importance of wages in public expenditures has 
made it politically difficult to cut government spending. 
The concentration of workers in large public institutions 
has facilitated their unionization. Public-sector unions 
are the strongest in the co11ntry and have managed to main-
tain higher wages than those for similar occupations in the 
private sector, while at the same time preventing any reduc-
tion in the absolute size of government. Moreover, the com-
petition for resources, particularly credit, has led to the 
crowding out of the private sector in the portfolio of the 
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banking system and has contributed to the stagnation of the 
economy. 
The fiscal constraint imposed by the recent crisis has 
resulted in a declining capacity of the public sector to 
absorb additional workers. Open unemployment increased from 
4.1 percent of the labor force in 1950 to 7.3 percent in 
1973, and to 9.4 percent in 1982. Economic stagnation and 
deterioration of the international terms-of-trade have made 
it impossible for the public sector to maintain a high rate 
of employment generation. Open unemployment has become a 
major political problem and has further complicated the pro-
cess of adjustment. 
EQUITY AND THE SIZE OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR 
Another major element of Costa Rican development stra-
tegy, aside from industrialization and regional integration, 
has been the emphasis on equity and improvements in the 
quality of life. This emphasis has been reflected in the 
major public investment in education, health, nutrition, 
social welfare assistance to low-income families, social 
security, and various public-sector services. The concern 
for equity may be attributed to the nature of the political 
system. The democratic process has encouraged participation 
of all citizens in the selection of political leaders and 
open debate of economic and social issues. There has always 
been an active vocal opposition party to question government 
policy. This has been Costa Rica's unique heritage in the 
region, and Stlccessive governments of different political 
persuasion have preserved and enhanced social equity. 
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As measured by the performance of most social indica-
tors and the development of a physical infrastructure for 
the benefit of all Costa Ricans, the results of the equity-
oriented policies are outstanding. Progress in health care, 
for example, has dramatically reduced mortality rates. In 
Latin America, only in Argentina, Uruguay, or Cuba will a 
person born today have as high a life expectancy as one born 
in Gosta Rica. In 1978 life expectancy was 73 years in the 
United States and 72 years in Costa Rica. Since life expec-
tancy in Costa Rica was only 55 years in 1950, much progress 
was accomplished during the past three decades. Similarly, 
infant mortality in Costa Rica has experienced a remarkable 
reduction, from 75 per 1,000 births in 1958 to 19 per 1,000 
births in 1980, and has rapLdly approached the level of 15 
per 1,000 births observed in the United States. Moreover, 
during the 1970s almost half of secondary-school age 
children were in school, and one-fifth of the university age 
cohort were attending an institution of higher education. 6 
The major beneficiaries of the growth experienced 
during the past decade and of many of these public-sector 
services have been the middle-income groups. Furthermore, 
the equity-oriented system has been very expensive, and a 
large bureaucracy has evolved to administer it. An 
increasing proportion of available resources has been 
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devoted to paying public-sector employees, while the bene-
fits reaching the respective target population have 
declined. Since the costs of these social programs have 
increased rapidly, exceeding the growth rate of public reve-
nues, the government has been forced to borrow domestically 
and abroad. The political costs associated with any expli-
cit reduction in these programs have been another major 
obstacle to policy adjustments. 
In striving to attain ambitious social and economic 
development goals, successive governments have initiated 
numerous programs and built an elaborate array of public 
institutions to plan, administer, control, and conduct 
public- and private-sector activities. With large amounts 
of foreign assistance, Costa Rica built an impressive net-
work of highways and feeder roads, an extensive electric 
power network, and a large telecommunications system. 
Although the positive impact of these investm(mts has been 
great, the costs have also been high. Due to external 
financing, payment for this investment has been deferred to 
the future in ways that may continue to be a drain on the 
ecc:nomy. Moreover, there has been considerable government 
intervention in the economy in terms of price controls, cre-
dit allocation, and subsidy schemes. 7 
The Costa Rican government has been not only a welfare 
state and an interventionist state, but an entrepreneurial 
state as well. Government ownership of several basic 
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industries, including public transportation, oil refining 
and distribution, cement and fertilizer production, sugar 
refining, agricultural exports, insurance and, most impor-
tantly, banking has given the government considerable 
leverage with which to channel a large share of resources 
toward public-sector enterprises. A conspicuous example is 
CODESA, a public investment corporation that has accounted 
for an increasing share of total investment, even in manu-
facturing. 
As a consequence of these policies, the public sector 
has become too large. Central government expenditures, 
which had represented 15.1 percent of the GDP in 1970, 
represented 21.8 percent by 1980. The protectionist stra-
tegy, which has relied heavily on tax exemptions and impli-
cit subsidies, has resulted in an income-inelastic tax 
structure. In 1970 central government revenues represented 
13.5 percent of the GDP, whereas by 1980 they represented 
only 12.7 percent. As a consequence of this behavior of 
expenditures and revenues, the central government deficit 
increased from 1.6 percent of the GDP in 1970 to 9.1 percent 
in 1980. If the rest of the public sector is added, the 
fiscal deficit represented 13.9 percent of the GDP by 1980. 
Moreover, by this time the public sector was contributing 
25.2 percent of the GDP, 38.7 percent of investment, and 6.1 
percent of savings, and was receiving 65.1 percent of the 
net increments in domestic credit. This size of the public 
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sector is a substantial burden on a small, open economy. 
Adjustment to external shocks thus requires a reduction in 
the size of the public sector, a politically difficult pro-
position. 
An important feature of the Costa Rican economy has 
been a high degree of government intervention in the finan-
cial sector. The four nationalized commercial banks have 
had a monopoly on demand and savings deposits and have 
accounted for over four-fifths of the assets of the finan-
cial system. These banks have been "characterized as slow, 
excessively conservative, and incapable of significantly 
contributing to the economic development of the country 
because of their implicit lending policies and their inabi-
lity to mobilize internal savings." 8 Transaction costs have 
been high, bank services poor, and the credit rationing cri-
teria arbitrary and vulnerable to political pressures. In 
the absence of competition, the banking system has been 
unresponsive to changing private-sector needs, steadily 
becoming obsolete, while a significant portion of its loan 
portfolio has been frozen due to default. Interest rate 
subsidies have resulted in substantial free transfers of 
resources to privileged borrowers, while credit portfolios 
have been highly concentrated in the hands of a few large 
borrowers. 
During the crisis, as inflation accelerated, the flows 
of new loans, measured in real terms, sharply declined, 
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affecting mostly productive activities. By 1982, the real 
size of the credit portfolio of the banking system was about 
40 percent of its size a few years earlier. In addition, 
the share of the public sector in the domestic credit flows 
had increased substantially, whereas the private sector was 
crowded out. As a consequence, the system was not only 
mobilizing too few domestic savingsi it was also contri-
buting to their misallocation. 
In summary, the structural problems associated with a 
conflict between the Costa Rican economy's most salient 
characteristics and the main features of the protectionist 
strategy of import substitution adopted have resulted in 
stagnation and rigidity. In addition, commodity-and-factor-
price policies have resulte<l in increasing unemployment, 
while the expansion of the public sec·tor and the unrespon-
siveness of the nationalized banking system have contributed 
to lack of growth and financial disequilibrium. All of 
these problems suggest the need for substantial discrete 
structural changes and policy adjustments, in order to 
reduce the degree and dispersion of protection, reduce the 
size of the public sector, and more effectively mobilize and 
allocate domestic savings through the banking system. 
Short-term instability and the perception that high politi-
cal costs are associated with these reforms have not facili-
tated the decisions. 
22 
TERMS-oF-TRADE INSTABILITY 
During the second half of the 1970s, Costa Rica 
experienced a comparatively large fluctuation in its inter-
national terms-of-trade. Although the information available 
for the 1950s is not completely reliable, it seems that 
during that period the country's terms-of-trade were more 
favorable than in the following two decades. For the 
1950-59 period, the simple average of the annual composite 
index of export to import prices stood at 128.8 percent of 
its base value for 1966. From a historical high of 148.8 
percent in 1954, however, this index had already declined to 
101.1 percent by 1960. During the 1960s, on the other hand, 
these terms were extremely stable. The difference between 
the highest and lowest values, of 106.1 percent (1964} and 
91.4 percent (1968), was only 14.7 points, whereas the dif-
ference had been 39.0 points during the 1950s. This stabi-
lity continued until 1974, when the index dropped to a low 
of 76.5 percent of its 1966 base. 
This sudden and significant worsening of the country's 
international terms-of-trade in 1974 was the consequence of 
the first oil crisis. It represented the fir~t instance of 
an external shock resulting from a change in import prices, 
rather than a change in export volumes or prices.Given the 
stability of international prices prior to 1974, as well as 
Costa Rica's diversified import basket, changes in export 
prices, particularly those of coffee, cocoa, sugar, bananas, 
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and beef had been the main determinants of changes in the 
country's terms-of-trade. After a period of almost complete 
stability, however, the index of import prices jt.lmped by 37 
percent in 1974. As a consequence of these changes and the 
expansionary credit policy that followed, the value of 
imports climbed from $455 to $720 million (a 58 percent 
increase in one year), while Costa Rica's trade deficit 
increased from $111 to $280 million, almost threefold. This 
was made possible by $13 million of surplus in the rest of 
the current account; $243 million of capital inflows (in 
comparison to $130 million the previous year); and a loss of 
$23 million in international monetary reserves. 
This worsening of the country's international terms-of-
trade was soon followed, however, by a rapid improvement and 
a significant growth in the value of exports, as a con-
sequence of the coffee boom. By 1977, the terms-of-trade 
index had recovered to 114.7 percent--an implied increase of 
38.2 points in three years. At the same time, the value of 
exports had climbed from $493 million in 1975 to $828 
million in 1977, whereas the trade deficit had been reduced 
to $194 million. This deficit would have declined even more 
had it not been fueled by the expansion of domestic credit 
and foreign borrowing. 
With the end of the coffee boom and the second oil cri-
sis, Costa Rica's terms-of-trade deteriorated again in 1978. 
The index had dropped to 91.9 percent by 1980, a reduction 
of 22.8 points in three years. By 1982 the index had 
further dropped to 72.4 and to 69.5 in 1983. Since the 
level of the index at the end of the decade was not par-
ticularly low by historical standards, the crisis must be 
primarily associated with the violent fluctuation 
experienced in a short period of time. 
This sharp fluctuation required a sharp adjustment. 
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External shocks are not new to Costa Rica. In the past, 
hcrwever, unfavorable shocks had been followed by favorable 
ones. The impact of the first oil shock, for instance, was 
soon followed by the coffee boom. In recent years, however, 
all the external influences have been unfavorable, while 
domestic policy responses have been particularly unfor-
tunate. Moreover, the economy has become less flexible, and 
the social and political costs of the required adjustments 
have increased. 
POLICY RESPONSES 
The oil crisis of 1974 imposed on costa Rica an impor-
tant adjustment problem. The deterioration of the country's 
terms-of-trade reduced real incomes and caused a contraction 
of the economy. The Figueres administration avoided the 
contraction by increasing the foreign debt and substantially 
expanding domestic credit. Domestic credit increased by 
45.5 percent, leading to a loss of international monetary 
reserves and contributing to the country's first infla-
tionary experience in half a century. The wholesale price 
index rose 26.4 percent in 1973 and 38.2 percent in 1974--
this in a country where the simple average of the annual 
change in this index had been only 1.5 percent per annum 
during the previous twenty-two years. Thus, the main 
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instruments of the Figueres administration to avoid the 
adjustment--foreign borrowing and domestic credit expansion--
resulted in much higher inflation than that induced by 
international price changes. At the same time, Costa Rica's 
public external debt increased from $296 million in 1973 to 
$379 million in 1974 and $511 million in 1975. 
In the following years, the large export earnings of 
the coffee boom made it possible to divert the inflationary 
pressures that resulted fro1n the continued expansion of 
domestic credit toward the balance of payments, thus 
avoiding domestic price increases. By 1977 the annual rate 
of increase in the wholesale price index had declined to 7.4 
percent. The coffee boom had validated, ~ ~~ the gamble 
of the Figueres administration, and Costa Rica adjusted to 
the impact of the first oil crisis with relative success. 
The extraordinary improvement of the country's terms-
of-trade and the rapid expansion of export earnings asso-
ciated with the coffee boom significantly increased real 
incomes. A good measure of the country's purchasing power 
is the gross national income (GNI)--that is, the gross 
national product corrected by the impact of changes in the 
terms-of-trade. In 1966 prices, the GNI increased by 12.5 
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percent in 1976 and by another 18.3 percent in 1977. This 
exceptional increase in real income made possible a substan-
tial expansion of consumption, imports, and government 
spending. In 1966 prices, private consumption increased by 
13.6 percent, public sector consumption by 8.8 percent, and 
imports by 25.1 percent during 1977 alone. In real terms, 
aggregate demand was 25.9 percent higher in 1977 than in 
1975. 
As a result of this expansion of aggregate demand, the 
economy became overheated. What was clearly an exceptional 
episode, in terms of the rate of improvement in real income, 
was rapidly accepted as the new norm. Coffee power had 
finally been achieved and this was celebrated with a 
spending euphoria. What was actually a transitory increase 
in income was viewed as a new higher level of permanent 
income, and aggregate spending was augmented accordingly. 
The Oduber administration made no effort to avoid this 
misperception. On the contrary, it actually stimulated the 
spending rush. No significant effort to mobilize domestic 
savings or increase taxation took place during the boom. 
Costa Rica continued to have one of the lowest ratios of 
domestic savings to the GDP in Latin America. Even at the 
peak of the boom, domestic savings represented only 12.7 
percent of the GOP. 
Moreover, given the attractive terms prevailing in the 
international capital markets, Costa Rica's foreign 
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borrowing increased rapidly. The country's public external 
debt grew to $646 million in 1976 and to $834 million in 
1977. By early 1978 the Oduber government was still 
borrowing abroad, at shorter terms and more restrictive con-
ditions, merely to pile up international monetary reserves, 
which mounted to over $300 million by May 1978 when Carazo 
came to power. These loans had to be repaid during the 
following months. Oduber's mercantilist policy had exacted 
a heavy price on the country. In sum, government behavior 
led the public to believe that the new levels of spending 
could be maintained indefinitely. The international banking 
community added to this perception. Foreign lenders were 
actively encouraging the government to borrow and confirmed, 
with their behavior, the overly optimistic outlook of the 
future. 
Thus, Costa Rica increased its level of aggregate 
spending not only in proportion to the exceptional revenues 
from the coffee boom but even beyond, aided by increasing 
inflows of foreign debt. By 1978, however, the country's 
terms-of-trade began to deteriorate again. With the same 
speed with which real purchasing power had increased during 
the coffee boom, it now declined. Between 1978 and 1981, 
the losses directly due to terms-of-trade changes increased 
eightfold, from 334 to 2,830 million colones. The latter 
loss was equivalent to one-third of the GDP. Also, the 
value of exports increased by only 4.4 percent in 1978 
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attempted to tnaintain at least their relative shares in the 
national incotne. The financial disequilibria were thereby 
increased, since the struggle of the social groups was faci-
litated by the government's expansionary credit policies. 
Domestic-credit expansion accentuated the balance-of-
payments crisis, augmented the size of the fiscal deficit, 
and rapidly accelerated inflation. Between 1978 and 1980 
Costa Rica's current account deficit increased from $363 to 
$664 million. This last deficit was financed by $192 
million of capital inflows, a loss of $198 million of inter-
national monetary reserves and $274 million of interest 
arrears and other special loans in 1980. Another $100 
million of reserves had already been lost during 1979. At 
the same time, the annual rate of increase of the wholesale 
price index had already risen to 24.1 percent in 1979, and 
reached 117.2 percent in 1981. 
POSTPONING THE ADJUSTMENT 
During the 1970s it became increasingly obvious that 
the strategy of import substitution was losing its dynamism. 
The early growth of manufacturing, during the easy stages of 
import replacement, was becoming more difficult to sustain, 
and Costa Rica's inability to compete in international 
markets became clear. The protectionist strategy, by 
favoring import-competing activities in the manufacturing 
sector, had reduced the relative profitability of exports. 
Toward the end of the decade, exports were also being 
heavily penalized by an exchange rate that overvalued the 
domestic currency. These policies, in the presence of 
inflationary pressures, led to a gradual stagnation of 
export volumes. 
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The slow growth of exports, in turn, severely limited 
the expansion of domestic manufactures, so dependent on 
imported inputs. The dynamic opportunities offered by the 
protectionist strategy were also disappearing in the other 
Central American countries. Insurgencies and political tur-
moil further contributed to the breakdown of the Common 
Market. At the same time, it became obvious that the fiscal 
deficit that resulted from the accelerated expansion of the 
public sector was becoming unmanageable. Many people 
discussed the need for a structural adjustment, including a 
sharp revision of the protectionist strategy, a reduction in 
the size of the public sector, and a financial reform. 
Manufacturers, organized as a powerful Chamber of 
Industries, bitterly argued against any reform. The govern-
ment claimed that the social costs of the adjustment were 
too high and accordingly postponed it. It was believed that 
any abandonment of the protectionist strategy would lead to 
widespread bankruptcies and that any reduction in the size 
of the public sector would bring high unemployment. The 
unfavorable short-term circumstances, due to the external 
shocks, further added to the perceived social and political 
~osts of the adjustment. 
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Toward the end of the decade the current account defi-
cit was almost nine times greater than at the beginning, 
while capital inflows were becoming less and less capable of 
financing these deficits. Economic and political instabi-
lity in Central America negatively impacted expectations. 
Both local and foreign investors rapidly lost confidence in 
the future of the region. New foreign investment disap-
peared, whereas repatriation of previous investment acce-
lerated. At the same time, Costa Ricans increased their 
investments abroad and substantial capital flight took 
place. As a consequence, the country was faced with a 
balance-of-payments deficit in both the current and the 
capital accounts and rapidly lost international monetary 
reserves. A balance-of-payments adjustment was necessary. 
The Carazo administration reacted to the external shock 
associated with the decline in primary commodity prices and 
the second oil crisis by further increasing foreign 
borrowing and expanding domestic credit. Growing infla-
tionary pressures and pessimistic expectations induced 
portfolio revisions. Costa Ricans started to replace their 
assets denominated in colones (particularly cash balances 
and other financial assets) with assets denominated in 
foreign currencies, further accentuating the capital 
outflow. Unwilling to facilitate an appropriate adjustment, 
Carazo refused to devalue the colon, even after the 
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country's net international monetary reserves became nega-
tive. A huge political cost was supposedly associated with 
a devaluation, and the president himself increased this cost 
by arguing that a devaluation would be the worst possible 
evil and by repeatedly insisting that he would not devalue. 
The rate of exchange was kept at 8.54 colo~~~ p~r dollar 
until September 1980, and when it was eventually freed, it 
rapidly increased to 38 colones by the end of 1981 and 65 
~olo~ by mid-1982. The adjustment had been postponed but 
not avoided. 
Carazo's refusal to devalue is a clear example of fear 
of the consequences of adjusting and of the resulting 
policy-making paralysis. It was evident that the overvalued 
exchange rate was responsible for the decline in export 
volumes and was subsidizing capital flight. Most Costa 
Ricans were firmly convinced that a devaluation was inevi-
table, so it was riskless to speculate against the colon. 
The extraordinary increase in foreign borrowing, was thus 
financing this speculation, further augmentin'] the demand 
for foreign currencies as well as the gap between the 
official and the equilibrium exchange rates. The consequen-
ces of this policy were both predictable and disastrous. 
Carazo's unwillingness to devalue made it necessary to 
increase the public external debt beyond any reasonable 
magnitude. The future growth of the Costa Rican economy was 
compromiae<l by the heavy burden of servicing t.his debt. The 
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speculative demand for foreign currencies, which was pro-
moted by the failure to devalue, increased the equilibrium 
level of the exchange rate far beyond what was necessary, 
thereby augmenting the magnitude of the price adjustment 
required. The substantial speculative movements that were 
thus subsidized resulted in massive redistributions of 
income, aggravating the sociopolitical situation. The delay 
in adjusting greatly increased adjustment costs. Structural 
changes, beyond devaluation, became even more difficult to 
pursue. 
IMPOVERISHMENT: THE SOCIAL COSTS OF POLICY PARALYSIS 
Costa Ricans will be much poorer in the 1980s than they 
were in the 1970s. A much lower rate of growth of output, 
particularly if structural ddjust1nents do not occur, com-
bined with a high rate of population growth will lead to a 
decline of per capita income during the first half of the 
decade and to a slow recovery during the second half. It 
has been estimated that even under ideal circumstances the 
1979 level of per capita income will not be realized again 
before 1990. This would require an average real rate of 
growth of GDP of 5.3 percent per annum between 1984 and 
1990--albeit a difficult target to achieve. Moreover, the 
continued deterioration of the country's international 
terms-of-trade means that the same GDP generates less 
purchasing power over foreign goods than before--this in a 
country where such goods have represented up to 50 percent 
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of the aggregate supply. Finally, a much larger proportion 
of the GDP will have to be devoted to servicing the 
country's external debt, instead of to domestic consumption 
and investment. Servicing this debt may require over 50 
percent of the value of exports and about 15 percent of the 
G DP each year. 
Costa Ricans will be paying in the future for the 
excess consumption of the late 1970s. Moreover, not only 
will debt service significantly reduce disposable income, 
but the foreign exchange requirement of this service will 
impose a drastic constraint on imports. In the absence of 
policy changes leading to an adjustment of the structure of 
production to the new circwustances, a reduction of imports 
of raw materials, intermediate inputs, and capital goods 
will impose a severe limitation on the growth rate of the 
manufacturing sector and, to a smaller extent, the agri-
cultural sector. This brake on growth, in turn, may even-
tually reduce the country's ability to service the external 
debt, thus possibly leading to a continuous and increasingly 
onerous rescheduling of the debt and even to formal 
bankruptcy. 
POLITICAL COSTS 
Costa Rica is currently experiencing the most serious 
crisis on its recent history--a truly major crisis given its 
depth, duration, and potential consequences for the 
country's sociopolitical and institutio1al framework. This 
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framework has itself increased the difficulties of adopting 
the policies requir·~d to pull out of the crisis and minimize 
its consequences. Very high social costs, higher than any 
the country has had to face before, will be paid before the 
adjustment is over. These costs are so great that they pose 
a difficult test for institutional stability and political 
equilibrium. Further delay of policy decisions to facili-
tate the appropriate adjustment, although politically 
attractive in the short run, would pose a major threat to 
the system itself. 
Costa Rica is an open society, with a long democratic 
tradition and a high degree of political participation. 
Numerous interest groups contribute to the decisionmaking 
process. The free press has been an important forum through 
which competing groups register their opinions and exercise 
their influence. The need for a consensus, however, delays 
major policy decisions. Measures have not been adopted with 
the speed, opportunity, and strength required. The same 
features that make the political system so attractive also 
make it vulnerable and fragile. 
The crisis has increased the vulnerability of the poli-
tical system due to the high expectations of Costa Ricans, 
already accustomed to a continued improvement in their stan-
dard of living. These expectations were reinforced by the 
high growth rates of the 1970s and confirmed by the coffee 
boom. During the 1980s, however, the Costa Rican economy 
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will not be in a position to satisfy the demands generated 
by these expectations. The declining dynamism of the 
economy will make it impossible not only to guarantee a con-
tinued improvement of living standards, but even to avoid 
impoverishment. 
Moreover, Costa Ricans have become accustomed to an 
institutional system that provides a large quantity of 
public goods: free education from primary school through 
university, free health care, and good nutrition for 
everyone. Cheap water and electricity have been introduced 
in most homes. Substantial income tranfers have been chan-
neled by the public sector, which in turn has provided many 
employment opportunities. Not only will the economy be 
unable to continue financing these services and transfers, 
but the size of the public sector itself will inevitably 
shrink. Many public goods, taken for granted, will no 
longer be freely provided. At the same time, economic 
stagnation and inflation will further worsen income distri-
bution. The burden of impoverishment will be shared more 
than proportionately by the already poor. ~h~s deteriora-
tion of standards of living will be faced by a generation 
that has not known adversity before. The resulting frustra-
tion may lead to social unrest and violence, so conspi-
cuously absent from Costa Rican history. 
Many have claimed that the politic~l costs of adjusting 
are too high and so justify their unwillingnehs to modify 
37 
economic policies. I conclude that, if the long-term 
deterioration of the political system is to be avoided, 
Costa Rica re•1uires a series of sharp, rapid adjustments 
induced by bold economic policy revisions, including a much 
lower and uniform rate of protection of import substitution 
manufacturing, a reduction in the level of implicit or 
explicit subsidies, a much smaller public sector, par-
ticularly in productive areas, and a drastic overhauling of 
the financial sector, in order to increase the share of 
domestic savings in financing investment. The Costa Rican 
democracy may not be able to survive the kind of prolonged 
crisis that would result from the continued postponement of 
this adjustment, particularly in view of the regional tur-
moil. Changes must be undertaken before expectations become 
even more pessimistic and before violence and confrontation 
upset the country's political fabric. Drastic policy 
changes may actually be the signal, for Costa Ricans and for 
foreigners, that the country possesses the will and 
discipline needed to overcome its crisis. 
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Claudio Gonzalez-Vega is Professor of Economics at the 
University of Costa Rica and the Autonomous University of 
Central America, both in San Jose, and Professor of 
Agricultural Economics and of Economics at Ohio State 
University. With regard to the issues covered in this 
chapter the a11thor acknowledges discussions with Alberto Di 
Mare and otheJ~ colleagues at COUNSEL7 with Eduardo Lizano, 
.,. .. " 
Victor Hugo C<~spedes and Ronul fo Jimenez, at Academia de 
" Centro America; and with Dale Adams, Douglas Graham, Richard 
Dubick, and Donald Schulz. Nevertheless, the author accepts 
full and sole responsibility for the ideas contained herein. 
1. Robert P~att et al., Private Sector: Costa Rica. 
A.I.D. Evaluation Special Study No. 9 (Washington, D.C.: 
Agency For International Development, March 1983), p. vi. 
2. Given the disequilibrium of the foreign exchange 
market, it is difficult to select an exchange rate to con-
vert colones into u.s. dollars. Under the author's assump-
tion that the equilibrium rate was close to 40 colones per 
dollar, this figure was equivalent to $2.5 billion. 
3. The text of this chapter includes the values of 
numerous economic variables. Some of these values are 
either reported in the following Statistical Annex or have 
been computed from figures in that annex. The remaining 
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data have been obtained from official sources, mostly 
Central Bank publications, and have been reported also in 
the following books: Claudio Gonzalez-Vega and victor Hugo 
C~spedes, Growth and Equity: Changes in !~come Distribution 
in Costa Rica (New York: United Nations, 1984); V. H. 
~spedes, Claudio Gonz~lez-Vega, Ronulfo Jim~nez, and Thelmo 
Vargas, Costa Rica: 
los 80s (San Jose: 
Problemas Economicos para la D~cada de 
, 
Editorial Studium, 1983); Victor Hugo 
, .. , 
Cespedes, Claudio Gonzalez-Vega, Ronulfo Jimenez, and 
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.. 
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; .. 
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.. 
Academia de Centro America, 1983); and in COUNSEL, 
.. 
Repertorio Economico (several years). 
4. Effective rates of protection indicate the extent to 
which domestic value added can exceed value added at competi-
tive international prices; they also take into account both 
nominal tariff rates on the product and its imported inputs. 
5. Alan I. Rapoport, "Effective Protection Rates in 
Central America," in Economic Integration i~ntral 
America, eds. William R. Cline and Enrique Delgado 
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1978). 
6. Gonzalez-Vega and Cespedes, Growth and Equit~. 
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7. See Pratt et a1., Private Sector, p. ix, for details or. 
several of these issues. 
























Costa Rica: Average Annual Rates of Growth, 
in Real Terms, of Selected Product1on 
Indicators, 1960-82 (Percentages). 
GDP GDP GDP 
Agri- Manu- Cons-
GDP GNP GNI cult. fact. truct. 
5.1 n.a. n.a. 3.2 9.2 5.8 
7.0 7 .oa 6.4a 8.1 9.3 4.3 
6.0 5.8 3.4 3.4 8.9 10.9 
5.2 4.7 5.8 1.8 6.0 9.4 
5.5 6.4 
- 1. 5 -1.7 12.7 7.8 
2.1 1.1 3.8 3.0 3.2 5.7 
5.5 5.1 12.5 0.5 5.8 20.8 
8.9 9.2 18.3 2.2 12.7 3.9 
6.3 5.5 0.2 6.6 8.2 5.8 
4.9 4.3 - 0.3 0.5 2.7 19.3 
0.8 -0.4 - 0.4 -o.s 0.8 - 1.1 
-2.3 -4.0 -28.9 5.1 -0.5 -21.7 
-9.1 -10. l -60.2 -4.9 -14.9 -32.6 



















Rates of growth have been canputed on the basis of 
values in constant 1966 prices. 
GDP: Gross Domestic Product. 
GNP: Gross National Product. 




Banco Central de Costa Rica, Cuentas Nacionales 
de Costa Rica (several~years); Victor Hugo 
Cesp~des, Claudio gonzalez-Vega et al., Problemas 
Economicos en la Decada de los 80 (San Jose: 
Editorial Studium, 1983); Victor Hugo Cespedes, 
C1audi9 Gonzalez-Vega et al~, Costa Rica: Una 
Economia en Crisis (San Jose: Editorial Studium, 
1983)i COUNSEL, Repertorio Economico (several 
months}. 
Table 2: Costa Rica: Average Annual Rates of Growth, in Real Terms, 
of Selected Macroeconomic Variables, 1960-82 (percentages). 
Per Per Gross Fixed 
Capita Capita Private Gov•t Fixed Invest. 
Year GOP Consump. Consump. Consump. Invest. & Invent. Exports Imports 
1960-65 1.4 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1965-70 4.4 3. 3a 6.4a 5.3a 10.oa 8.4a o.5a 13.6a 
1970-75 2.7 0.8 3.2 5.4 4.2 6.2 7.4 3.1 
1975-80 2.5 2.5 5.2 5.8 9.4 12.6 4.4 9.2 
1974 3.4 n.a. 5.2 8.4 9.7 8.6 7.3 9.4 
1975 - 1.1 n.a. 2.2 5.7 - 1.2 - 8.9 - 2.0 - 7.3 
1976 6.1 n.a. 4.2 7.8 23.7 26.5 5.4 16.2 
1977 3.5 10.7 13.6 8.8 12.4 22.8 8.2 25.1 
1978 2.2 5.6 8.4 3.7 8.1 - 0.4 9.9 7.5 
1979 - 2.0 - 0.3 2.4 7.7 15.3 9.3 3.3 2.9 
1980 - 7.1 - 4.5 - 1.8 1.5 - 9.4 7.0 - 4.3 - 3.4 
1981 - 5.1 -11.3 - 8.5 -5.6 -24.9 -37.7 11.1 -26.3 
1982 -11.9 -12.6 - 9.8 -2.8 -38.7 -48.1 -10.1 -32.0 
1983b 
- 2.0 - 1.5 1.3 2.7 - 7.3 5.8 o.o 4.3 
Notes: Rates of growth have been computed on the basis of values in constant 
1 966 colones. 
a For 1966-70. 
b Preliminary estimates. 
Sources: The same as in Table 1. 
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Table 3. Costa Rica: Proportions of Gross Domestic 
Product. for Selected Sectors of Economic 
Activity, 1950-82 (percentages). 
-------.A9ri--Manu----ceiifra1 ___________ 
Year cult. fact. Gov't. Other Exports Imports 
Nominal Terms 
1955 38.3 13.3 7.7 40.7 25.0 26.0 
1960 26.0 14.2 9.0 50.8 21.4 26.2 
1965 23.5 26.8 9.7 50.0 22.8 33.3 
1970 22.5 18.3 10.6 48.6 28.2 35.0 
1974 19.4 20.3 11.9 48.4 33.5 48.3 
1975 20.3 20.4 12.4 46.9 30.4 38.7 
1976 20.4 19.7 13.0 46.9 29.4 35.3 
1977 21.9 99.0 12.9 46.2 31.1 36.5 
1978 20.4 18.8 14.0 46.8 28.4 36.2 
1979 18.5 18.3 15.0 48.2 26.9 37.3 
1980 17.8 18.6 15.2 48.4 26.5 36.8 
1981 23.0 18.9 13.4 44.7 43.3 48.2 
1982 24.7 20.3 11.7 43.3 43.3 39.2 
198~ 23.3 19.9 13.1 43.7 34.5 35.4 
Real terms a 
1957 24.4 14.1 12.1 49.4 n.a. n. a. 
1960 25.2 13.8 11.3 49.7 n.a. n.a. 
1965 22.9 16.7 10.8 49.6 25.0 30.9 
1970 24.1 18.6 9.9 47.4 34.2 39.6 
1974 21.0 21.0 10.2 47.8 37.9 37.9 
1975 21.2 21.2 10.3 47.3 36.4 34.4 
1976 20.2 21.3 10.1 48.4 36.4 37.8 
1977 19.0 22.0 9.8 49.2 36.1 43.5 
1978 19.0 22.4 9.7 48.9 37.4 44.0 
1979 18.2 22.0 9.7 50.1 36.8 43.1 
1980 18.0 22.0 10.0 50.0 34.9 41.3 
1981 19.3 22.4 10.4 47.9 39.7 31.1 
1982 20.2 20.9 11.2 47.7 39.2 23.3 
1983b 21.0 20.4 11.1 47.5 38.9 24.1 
-------
a In 1966 prices. 
b Preliminary estimates 
Sources: The same as in Table 1. 
Table 4. Costa Rica: Selected Indicators of Population, Employment 
and Unemployment, 1950-82. 
Total Annual Rates of Growth Proportion of Labor Force 

















( •ooo > Po;eulation Total Private Public Unemployment Em;eloyment 
858 3.3 n.a. n.a. n.a. 4.1 n.a. 
1, 380 3.7 2.5a 1.9a 8.8a 6.9 n.a. 
1,872 3.1 3.6a 3.4a 5.la 7.3 n.a. 
2,018 2.5 4.4a 3.8a 7.7a 6.3 9.0 
2,071 2.6 6.4 5.4 11.5 4.6 7.5 
2,126 2.7 5.6 4.2 12.1 4.6 7.6 
2,184 2.7 3.3 3.6 2.2 4.9 9.6 
2, 245 2.8 0.9 - 0.6 7.4 5.9 10.5 
2,306 2.7 0.5 0.7 0.1 8.7 14.6 
2,370 2.7 4.6 7.0 - 5.3 9.4 16.4 
2,434 2.7 1.0 - 0.5 8.0 9.0 n.a. 
Open unemployment: those members of the working force who are looking for a job 
and can not find one. 
Visible underemployment: those members of the working force who can find only a 
part-time job. (Equivalent rate). 
Annual averages for the 1950-63, 1963-73, and 1973-76 periods. 
Preliminary estimates. 
Direccion General de Estadistica y Censos, Censos de Poblaci~n (1950, 1963, 
and 1973); Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Soc~al, Encuesta Nacional de 
Hoga;es, Empleo y Desem;eleo (several years); victor Hugo Cespedes and Claudio 
Gonzalez-Vega, Growth and Equity. Changes in Income Distribution in Costa Rica 
(New York: United Nations, 1983). 
Table 5. Costa Rica: Proportions of the Labor Force Employed in 
Different Sectors, 1950-82 (percentages) • 
----- ·--- --~--
Year A_9Eicult. Manufact. Construct. Other Private Public Urbana 
1950 54.7 11.3 4.3 29.7 93.9 6.1 36.2 
1963 49.7 11.7 5.5 33.1 86.7 13.3 37.0 
1973 38.2 12.9 6.9 42.0 84.7 15.3 43.4 
1976 34.8 14.6 6.5 44.1 83.2 16.8 46.1 
1977 33.0 15.8 6.4 44.8 82.4 17.6 47.0 
1978 30. 3 15.2 7.4 47.1 81.3 18.7 47.5 
1979 28.7 16.3 7.7 47.3 81.5 18.5 47.8 
1980 27.4 16.3 7.8 48.5 80.3 19.7 48.3 
1981 27.8 15.6 6.8 49.8 80.4 19.6 48.8 
1982 30.2 15.4 5.7 48.7 82.3 17.7 48.4 
1983b 28.3 16.4 5.2 50.1 81.0 19.0 49.6 
a Proportions of the total labor force. 
b Preliminary estimates. 













Table 6. Costa Rica: Indexes of Import and Export Prices, International 
Terms-of-Trade, and Real Wages, 1950-82. 
Index Annual Rates of Chan~e 
Export Import Terms Export Import Terms Real 
Year Prices Prices Trade Prices Prices Trade Wages 
1950 98.4 78.8 124.9 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1955 124.2 104.1 119.3 4.8a 5.7a - 0.9a n.a. 
1960 96.2 95.1 101.1 - 5.0 - 1.8 - 3. 3 n.a. 
1965 100.5 99.3 101.3 0.9 0.9 o.o n.a. 
1970 86.7 99.4 87.2 - 2.9 o.o - 3.0 n.a. 
1975 145.2 182.7 79.4 10.9 12.9 - 1.9 n.a. 
1980 231.6 252.0 91.9 9.8 6.6 3.0 n.a. 
1974 127.7 167.1 76.5 19.9 37.1 -12.5 - 4.4 
1975 145.2 182.7 79.4 13.7 9.3 3.8 - 2.6 
1976 164.2 173.7 94.5 13.1 - 4.9 19.0 5.6 
1977 209.8 182.9 114.7 27.8 5.3 21.4 6.4 
1978 195.8 193.7 101.1 - 6.7 5.9 -11.9 7.2 
1979 205.2 222.1 92.4 4.8 14.7 - 8.6 6.0 
1980 231.6 252.0 91.9 12.9 13.5 - 0.5 - 3.9 
1981 211.9 269.2 78.7 - 8.5 6.8 -14.4 - 6.2 
1982 210.4 290.8 72.4 - 0.7 8.0 - 8.0 -29.0 
1983b 214.2 308.2 69.5 1.8 6.0 - 4.0 n.a. 
Notes: Index of export and import prices in u.s. dollars. 
Terms-of-trade are the ratio of export to import prices. 
a Average annual rates of change for the periods 1950-55, 1955-60, etc. 
Rates of change of a real wage index {base year: 1973), when wages are 
deflated by the consumer price index. 
b Preliminary estimates. 
Sources: Banco Central de Costa Rica, Balanza de Pagos (several years); 
Claudio Gonzalez-Vega and victor Hugo Cespedes, Growth and Equity. 
Changes in Income Distribution in Costa Rica (New York: United 
Nations, 1983}. See also sources for Table 4 and for Table 1. 
Table 7. Costa Rica: Annual Rates of Price Changes, Interest Rates, 
and Exchange Rates, 1950-82. 
-Annual Rates of Chan9e Real 
GDP Agricult. Manufact. Exchange Interest 
Year Deflator Deflator Deflator WPI CPI Rate Rate 
1950-55 n.a. n.a. n.a. - 1.4 2.0 6.63a n.a.a 
1955-60 - 0.4b - 6.2b l.9b 0.4 1.5 6.63 n.a. 
1960-65 1.4 3.3 1.0 0.3 1.3 6.6 3 6.3 
1965-70 3.4 1.5 3.0 4.8 3.1 6.63 - 3.3 
1970-75 13.9 14.5 13.4 17.4 14.7 8.54 - 2.0 
1975-80 13.8 14.5 11.0 13.3 9.7 14.40 - 3.3 
1974 23.2 27.0 19.1 38.2 n.a. 8.54 -20.1 
1975 24.5 29.3 21.0 14.0 20.5 8.54 - 2.0 
1976 16.6 22.7 12.3 7.2 4.4 8.54 4.9 
1977 16.9 33.8 8.9 7.4 5.3 8.54 4.5 
1978 7.9 0.3 4.6 9.4 8.1 8.54 2.5 
1979 9.1 3.3 9.0 24.1 13.2 8.54 - 9.2 
1980 18.8 15.8 20.7 19.3 17.8 14.40 - 3. 3 
1981 44.6 69.7 41.2 117.2 65.1 37.80 -45.2 
1982c 93.5 91.6 113.4 79.1 81.8 45.20 -32.2 
Notes: WPI: Wholesale price index. Base year: 1966. 
CPI: COnsumer price index. Base year: 1975. 
Exchange rate: colones per u.s. dollar, at the end of the year. 
Real interest rate on colones term deposits, with respect to WPI. 
a At the end of the five-year periods. 
b For 1957-1960. 
c Preliminary estimates. 
Sources: Banco Central de Costa Rica. Cuentas Nacionales and Boletin 
Estadistico (several years). Direccion General de Estadistica y 
Censos. Indice de Precios al Consumidor de Ingresos Medios y Bajos 
del Area Metropqlitana de San Jose (several years). COUNSEL, 
Repertorio Economico (several years). 
Table B. Costa Rica: Balance of Payments and Public External 
Debt. (Millions u.s. dollars). 1950-1982. 
Change Public 
Trade Current Priv. Offic. Capital Net External 
Year Exp. Imp. Balance Account a ca12. ca12. Account Reserves Debt 
1950 54 46 8 1 n.a. n.a. 
- 2 - 1 29 
1955 81 87 - 6 - 7 n.a. n. a. 11 4 23 
1960 84 110 - 26 - 19 n.a. n.a. 16 - 3 28 
1965 112 178 - 66 - 67 n.a. n.a. 69 2 148 
1970 231 317 - 86 - 74 n.a. n.a. 58 - 16 164 
1974 440 720 -280 -266 168 75 243 - 23 379 
1975 493 694 -201 -218 106 133 239 21 511 
1976 593 770 -178 -201 137 129 266 65 646 
1977 828 1, 022 -194 -226 156 178 334 109 834 
1978 865 1,166 -301 -363 103 233 336 - 27 1,044 
1979 934 1, 397 -462 -558 57 400c 457 -100 1,398 
1980 1,002 1,524 -522 -664 63d 403c 466 -198 117 35 
1981 860 1,209 -200 -409 - 48d 41lc 362 
- 47 2,743 
1982b l, 008 867 -7 -209 49d 298c 347 138 3,438 
1983b 803 930 -127 -373 100d 178c 278 - 95 n.a. 
a :~~~;ies overdue interest on public sector loans, not paid and which amounted to $178.3 
(1980), $292.5 (1981), $316.5 (1982), and $412.6 (1983). 
b Pre1~m~nary estimates. 
c Includes IMF loans and other balance-of-payments assistance. 
d Includes errors and omissions. 
Sources: Banco Central d~ Costa Rica, Balanza de Pages (several years); COUNSEL, 






















Table 9. Costa Rica: Selected Fiscal, Credit and Monetary 
Indicators, 1950-1982. 
Ratios with ResEect to GDP Ratio Proport. 
Public Money Dom. Public 
Central Gov' t Sector Supply Domestic Savings/ Sector 
Expend. Reven. DeficJ.t Deficit M2 Savin~s Net inv. Credit 
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 7.9 n.a. 23.1 
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 20.5a 3.8 n.a. 5.9 
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 22.2 7.5 60.7 12.7 
16.1b 12.lb 4.ob n.a. 22.9 2.2 15.6 14.5 
15.1 13.5 1.6 n.a. 24.4 6.9 45.2 19.1 
17.6 14.6 3.0 n.a. 3.05 5.1 22.2 19.6 
17.5 13.5 4.0 n.a. 33.0 5.7 32.0 20.5 
19.2 13.0 6.2 n.a. 35.8 10.7 54.2 23.0 
17.7 13.2 4.4 n.a. 36.8 12.7 61.1 26.6 
19.6 13.6 6.0 9.0 41.6 8.6 43.4 28.7 
20.6 12.6 8.0 11.9 57.3 6.9 31.6 38.0 
21.8 12.7 9.1 13.9 42.4 7.1 30.2 44.3 
16.6 12.5 4.1 14.0 54.9 11.7 42.7 46.7 
16.6 13.2 3.4 9.9 46.6 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
19.7 16.5 3.2 n.a. n.a. n.a. .., a n q . 
All ratios of fiscal magnitudes are computed with respect to Gross Domestic 
Product, except that of Domestic Savings, which is given with respect to National 
Disposable Income. The proportion of public-sector credit includes the share of 




Banco Central de Costa Rica, Memoria Anual and Credito y Cuentas Monetarias 
(several years). The same as J.n Table 1. 
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while, as a consequence of the second oil crisis, the value 
of imports increased by 14.2 percent. The trade deficit 
jumped to $301 million, and a new adjustment was required. 
The time had arrived for consumption, imports, and 
government spending to return to their historical levels. 
Political opposition to the contraction, however, was 
fierce. The spending orgy had created all kinds of expec-
tations, and no one wanted to rectify the earlier mistakes. 
The Carazo administration did not help matters. Based on a 
weak coalition, it could not control the efforts of various 
pressure groups to avoid the direct impact of the adjust-
ment. Carazo himself wanted to be remembered for his 
efforts to expand the country's physical infrastructure and 
for his role in the overthrow of the Somoza regime. Both 
targets were expensive. He chose, therefore, to postpone 
the adjustment. Again, the main tool for this postponement 
was borrowing in the international capital markets. The 
country's public external debt increased to $1,735 million 
by 1980, in per capita terms the highest in the Third World. 
In late 1982 this debt represented over one and a half years 
of Costa Rica's GDP and amounted to about $1,500 per capita. 
The country's private external debt represented about $1,000 
million more. 
All social groups struggled to maintain the standard of 
living achieved during the coffee boom. As it became 
obvious that impoverishment was inevitable, these groups 
